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Postmodernity, Globalisation and Nationalist
Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia
ADRIAN KAVANAGH
During the 1990s, several of the conflicts that have demanded most media attention
have been associated with the disintegration of the Yugoslav Federation. A number of
attempts have been made to outline the main causes of these, but these causal factors
remain difficult to describe definitively, largely owing to the complexity of the post-
Yugoslav political landscape. This paper studies the validity of employing a
postmodern paradigm for investigating the conflicts in former Yugoslavia, as well as
other current conflicts, arguing that the present cultural and philosophical context has
to be addressed. After an outline of some of the key aspects of postmodernity, the
focus centres on the importance of the media and the postmodern perspective on the
issue of the nation state. Key theories related to postmodern conflict, with relation to
economic and cultural factors, are outlined. These are evaluated as regards their
applicability to the Yugoslav conflicts and - by extension - to all future wars in the
postmodern era.
Introduction
Up to the events associated with the fall of the Eastern European
Communist regimes in 1989, the continent of Europe had, since the end of
World War II, remained free of major conflict. Most of Eastern Europe has
made the political transformation to Western style democracy in a peaceful
manner. However the same could not be said for the former Yugoslavia,
which has proven to be the only part of the continent, excluding the former
Soviet Union, to be gripped by extensive bloody conflicts. A number of
different, yet interrelated, wars erupted there in the 1990s, the causes of
which are many and complex.
This paper analyses the Yugoslav conflicts in terms of the cultural
context in which these took place, namely that of a postmodern and
increasingly globalising world. To root this discussion, this paper will
commence with an outline of the main economic, societal and cultural
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POSTMODERNITY AND NATIONALIST CONFLICT 35
developments of the late twentieth century that can be associated with the
twin processes of postmodernity and globalisation. As a means towards
constructing a postmodern framework of conflict, two key elements of these
processes, namely the importance of the media and the declining role of the
nation state, shall be focused on and related in turn to the Yugoslav
conflicts. Finally the key strands in postmodern theories of conflict shall be
outlined, discussed, and analysed as regards their efficacy for explaining the
recent wars in the Balkans.
Postmodernity and Globalisation
While difficult to exactly describe, as it contains many apparently
contradictory elements, postmodernity can perhaps be best defined simply
as the period subsequent to that of modernity. Indeed in some cases
postmodern aspects have developed as a reaction to contentious elements in
modernity. For instance, concerned with modernity's canonisation of
progress, science and technology, postmodernity has pointed to the
continuance of war, famine and environmental catastrophe in the modern
era as reasons to view such views with suspicion. Postmodernists,
moreover, dismissing notions of absolute truth in favour of relativism, have
also discounted the modernist concept of the metanarratives. This is on the
basis that they involve a form of bogus scientificity, demand a high degree
of centralisation and social engineering, and run the risk of resulting in
horrific excesses, such as the Holocaust or religious persecutions, when
they are most 'efficiently' implemented.
If modernity has been perceived as the cultural logic of industrial
capitalism, then the development of advanced or flexible capitalism is key
to postmodernity. This involves a Post-Fordist economy, in which advances
in technology, transport and capital fluidity have led to a decreased
dependence on plant and fixed capital, a heterogeneity of branch-plant
economies, and an increased reliance on information technology. Indeed,
information has arguably emerged as the most important commodity in
postmodern society. Most of the recent economic growth in the advanced
economies has been linked to innovations in associated technologies. Using
the terminology of Kondratieff's wave theory, information based
technologies can be envisaged as the technological innovation powering the
current upward phase of the Kondratieff wave. Some commentators,
moreover, argue that information has become so important a commodity
that future conflicts could erupt simply on the basis of attaining access to it.
The fact that most information-based economic growth appears to benefit
the highly educated and those with access to the new technologies, at the
expense of the socially and economically marginalised, is a cause of
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36 GEOPOLITICS
concern. Many industrial workers have been cast into long-term
unemployment because of new labour-saving technology, leading Arruda to
refer to the current wave of economic growth as 'jobless growth'.1 Such
growth proves a means of maintaining, or even intensifying, current gaps in
well-being between the core and peripheral regions.
Another aspect of postmodernity that requires attention is its upholding
of a tolerance for, and growing interest in, ethnic diversity. This has
involved giving a voice to ethnic minorities who previously had not been
allowed a voice during the period of modernity. Despite this, an outbreak of,
or intensification in, violent inter-ethnic conflict in diverse regions of the
world has marked the postmodern era. This is perhaps one of the key
paradoxes in postmodernity, in that the potential it offers for greater ethnic
harmony and interaction often coexists simultaneously with increases in
ethnically motivated hatred and violence. Often, sadly, postmodern
influence in this area can extend no further than widening the variety of
food types available to people, for, as Fukuyama notes, many simply
perceive cultural diversity as involving 'a great choice among Chinese,
Italian, Greek, Thai, or Mexican restaurants'.2 Hence the racist thug
attacking Chinese immigrants can minutes later be eating a Chinese take-
away; the irony of which is lost on him.
Another aspect of postmodernity that demands some regard here is its
treatment of Fukuyama's concept of the 'end of history'. In his famous
essay, 'The End of History?', Fukuyama claimed that the decline of the
Communist regimes in Eastern Europe had spelt the triumph of liberal
democratic capitalism over Communism.3 This, in effect, spelt the 'end of
history' in that it also marked the end of all alternative political and
economic systems to liberal capitalism. Certain postmodernists have
attacked his ideas: the main problem for them being Fukuyama's apparent
denial of the existence of 'other histories', such as those of Islam or the
Third World. Glenny has, by contrast to Fukuyama, conceived of the
Eastern European revolutions as amounting to a 'rebirth of history'.4
Moreover, as the 1990s have seen a considerable redrawing of the Eastern
European political map, one could claim that the 'end of history' spells the
'time of geography'!
Postmodernity itself proposes the 'end of history' in that it disputes the
modernist notion that history can be shaped by humans so as to achieve
certain aims or dreams. Instead it prefers to cultivate a sense of immediacy
where there are no real past or future and no big goals. This translates itself
into a view of history known as nostalgia. With such a view of history, the
context and cultural concerns of the present drive all representations of the
past, and myth and historical stereotyping often prove of more 'value' than
factual details about the past. It is hardly surprising, in such a context, that
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POSTMODERNITY AND NATIONALIST CONFLICT 37
the Greater Serbia project of the Milosevic regime would achieve so much
support from ordinary Serbs, fuelled as it was by the culturally intoxicating
combination of the Kosovo myth and historical remembrance.
Like postmodernity, globalisation too has been the source of serious
debate in the past decade. While it proves difficult to provide an exact
definition of what it entails, in this paper globalisation will be described as
a process involving a greater interdependence and interconnectivity
between the different parts of the globe. This is a process that impacts on
politics, economies and culture, and has been permitted by recent advances
in the fields of transport, communications and information technology.5
Globalisation can be seen as another form of neo-colonialism in which
national economies become increasingly integrated into, and dominated by,
the activities of transnational corporations and global financial agencies,
such as the IMF and the World Bank. This has a spatial element in that the
actions of these bodies have increased the experience of poverty in the more
impoverished regions of the globe. This has peripheralised them further,
leading to what Kellner called an 'exponential growth' in the gaps in
economic well-being on a regional, national and global scale.6
The Media and Conflict
Amongst the forces that shape opinions and culture in our postmodern
world, it is undoubtedly the agents of the global media that hold most sway,
especially television. This is due to the decline of print media in favour of
more instantaneous forms continuing into the postmodern era, and
underpinned by Baudrillard's conception of the visual image being the all-
powerful element of postmodern culture. The power of television in our
contemporary culture is undeniable. It has progressed to such an extent that
Coleman has argued that all forms of public discourse, such as politics,
education and religion, must change in nature considerably so as to be in a
position to respond adequately to the demands of television.7 Hence it is
very important to consider who controls television. Some television stations
are state run, and hence they are likely to reflect, to some extent, the values
and concerns of the governments who provide their finances, no matter how
independent a brief they may have. Other stations are controlled, directly or
indirectly, by global multimedia corporations and, as such, will always be
portraying values and concerns that parallel those of economic, societal and
cultural globalisation.
In terms of its impact on postmodern conflict scenarios, it can be argued
that television can have a positive role to play in terms of bringing atrocities
and crisis situations to the attention of the watching 'global village'. This
allows for the shaping of public opinion, so as to persuade various
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38 GEOPOLITICS
governments that political capital can be gained by an interventionist
strategy in certain crises, as happened most recently with regard to Kosovo.
Such a position was seen in the earlier stages of the Bosnian conflict. In
1992, as Bosnian Serb forces succeeded in taking nearly 75 per cent of its
territory, verbal reports of atrocities linked to ethnic cleansing were
emerging from these conquered territories. However, it was not until
television pictures were broadcast by ITN from the Omarska detention
camp in northern Bosnia that the attention of the world was focused on the
humanitarian crisis. July 1995 saw the massacre of over 7,000 Muslims at
Srebrenica, the largest scale mass murder in Europe since the end of the
Second World War. This event jwas portrayed on television solely by means
of eyewitness reports and aerial photography of mass graves. Hence it did
not have the same visual impact as the death of 37 people due to a mortar
shell in Sarajevo on 28 August 1995, the horror of which was televised all
over the world. It was in the wake of the Sarajevo incident rather than the
genocide in Srebrenica that NATO attacks on the Bosnian Serbs were
launched in the autumn of 1995.8 It is hardly surprising, in this context, that
television has been portrayed as playing a key role in determining the
policy-making of the main Western powers during the Bosnian crisis.9
While this may be too bald an evaluation of television's role, there is some
rationale for holding that television, and other media forms, can have some
impact in spurring governments towards military involvement, although not
perhaps to the extent envisaged by the 1997 Bond movie Tomorrow Never
Dies. It could, of course, also be suggested that governments used television
as a means of manipulating public opinion in favour of military
interventions that would have taken place anyway.
However television can also have the impact of lessening the desire for
involvement in a conflict situation. It can also be noted that it has at times
played a role in either adding unnecessary complexity to, or over-
simplifying, the analysis of the causal factors underlying conflict situations.
Often such reporting has in part helped to legitimate the inactivity and
apathy of the international community when faced with crises requiring
their engagement. Thus, by presenting the Yugoslav conflicts in the early
1990s as merely the reoccurrence of an outbreak of ancient hatreds in the
Balkans, the Western media were able to imply that all the sides in the
combat were equally to blame. This implied that any involvement in the
crisis would be misguided. Sadkovich's study of the US media's treatment
of the earlier phases of the Yugoslav conflicts offers an apt portrayal of such
methods being employed.10 This, he claims, was partially due to a need to
justify the non-interventionist stance of the Bush government, but it was
also due to other factors such as hostility towards the creation of smaller
states amongst certain neo-imperialistic elements of the US media. Wheeler
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POSTMODERNITY AND NATIONALIST CONFLICT 39
notes that Western journalism helped create an impression that 'the peoples
of the Balkans inhabit a realm of preternatural barbarism, ludicrous
ambitions, congenital perfidy, inveterate cruelty and unfathomable
complexity with which the civilized world is ill advised to cope.'11 Such
careless and tardy stereotyping of the situation in the former Yugoslavia
helped to convince the Western public that any intervention would be
pointless and foolhardy, hence legitimising their governments' laissez-faire
attitude towards the situation.
As happened in the case of the Yugoslav conflict, warring factions can
also use the media for propaganda purposes, either in the lead up to, or
during, a conflict. This can be achieved either by demonising the opposing
side or by portraying their side in categories that are both accessible and
attractive to their own citizenry. In the lead up to the conflicts in Croatia
and Bosnia, the Serbian media played a role in driving the ethnic Serbs in
these republics to demand secession, by convincing them that their identity
and even their lives would come under threat with the establishment of the
two republics as independent states. The Serbs in Eastern Bosnia were
urged to take part in the conflict because of warning of alleged Muslim
plans to launch a jihad against them. Such allegations were not true,
especially as the Bosnian Muslims were at the time mainly secular in
outlook. Unscrupulous Serb leaders, both in Belgrade and Pale, as well as
the machinations of the Serb media, engineered these warnings of a. jihad.
Media influence was evidenced most strikingly in the broadcasts of Radio
Television Belgrade, which constantly warned of the dangers of a
fundamentalist jihad in the months leading up to the outbreak of hostilities
in Bosnia. These dire warnings had the effect of creating, as Malcolm terms
it, a 'psychology of terror' amongst the ordinary Bosnian Serb population,
driving them to believe that the threats were real and that they would have
to defend themselves against their Muslim neighbours.12 During the recent
bombardment of Yugoslavia, the influence of Serbian propaganda in
promoting its country's war effort was perceived by the NATO forces to be
of sufficient magnitude to warrant aerial attacks on the television station in
Belgrade and other elements of the media apparatus. As a corollary to this,
the inability or unwillingness of the Serb authorities to launch a strong
media offensive on international audiences in the 1990s was to be
contrasted with the Croats and Bosnian Muslims who both placed great
stress on public relations with the rest of the world. This ensured that over
time the sympathy of the West would rest with the opponents of the Serbs:
a factor that would have a great bearing on the eventual outcome of the
conflicts.
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40 GEOPOLITICS
The Nation State and Nationalism
The nation state was the prime unit of territorial organisation in the era of
modernity, emerging in Europe out of the political fragmentation of the
feudal period. However, in the postmodern era the role of the nation state is
declining with the ever-increasing impact of globalisation. In terms of
politics, its role is being eroded by a complex combination of centrifugal
and centripetal forces. For example, greater transnational political union in
Western Europe is occurring in tandem with instances of political
fragmentation within Europe, unparallelled since the end of World War 1.
Such political fragmentation has impacted mainly on Eastern Europe, but
also to a lesser degree on parts of Western Europe such as Scotland,
Northern Ireland, northern Italy, Catalonia and the Basque region. Adding
further confusion to this picture is the fact that these two processes can
sometimes intersect. For instance, Slovenia and Estonia, which were
formerly constituent republics of the former Yugoslavia and the former
Soviet Union respectively, are expected to be in the next wave of countries
joining the European Union.
A key aspect of postmodern society is the replacement of the nation state
by economic blocks such as the EU and NAFTA in terms of its role of
initiating effective economic interventions.13 Processes associated with
globalisation, such as the growing impact of global financial institutions,
like the IMF, and multinational corporations on different national
economies, are proving a key mechanism in which the role of the nation
state, as regards its control over macroeconomic policies, is being denuded.
Commenting on the role of transnational corporations, Baum claims that
they have taken the control over the distribution of power and wealth that
national governments once had.14 Owing to their lack of concern for social
justice, this has resulted in an increasing gap between rich and poor, a
growth in unemployment levels and an individualist culture that is marked
by a lack of social solidarity. This in turn, it could be argued, has resulted in
the emergence or strengthening of national separatist movements in parts of
Europe and North America, which had up to the late 1970s appeared
immune to such pressures. Often these arose in response to the deprivation
suffered as a result of the adverse impact of multinational corporations and
neo-liberal economic policies such as Thatcherism or Reaganomics. A
similar scenario has developed related to the structural adjustment policies
unleashed by the IMF and World Bank on states, mainly in the Third World,
that were unable to pay debts owed to these institutions in the wake of the
global financial crises of the 1970s and 1980s. These policies involved
economic austerity programmes, which eschewed social security and
employment creation in favour of economic growth. They also placed great
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POSTMODERNITY AND NATIONALIST CONFLICT 41
emphasis on free trade and promoted export-oriented production at the
expense of domestic production. For the Yugoslav economy, the
intervention of the IMF was to result in austerity programmes that would
mean low or negative GDP growth rates from 1980 onwards, severe
commodity shortages and hyperinflation, thus creating the conditions for
the growth of nationalist violence in the 1980s.
With the growing invasion of global media products, mainly American
in origin, into different parts of the world, there is a fear that the legitimacy
of nation states will be further imperilled by this as a form of cultural
imperialism. Some commentators view this form of cultural globalisation as
a form of 'Americanisation', while Smith refers to it as a process of
'electronic internationalisation'.15 It could be argued that this process could
prove a means of evoking a displacement of nationhood and national
cultures through the import of cultural, entertainment and artistic
commodities. Hence, it is hardly surprising that Smith envisages the key
role of the nation state today as defending its cultural homogeneity in the
face of the 'transborder data-flows' that are imperilling this. He claims that
the state has already yielded its ability to determine its economic, political
and military destiny to various supranational agencies, although he does
warn against assigning too great a weight to this process.16 Such cultural
globalisation can have the effect of further strengthening the core regions'
political and economic dominance.
In his consideration of both postmodernity and globalisation, Harvey
notes how the associated concept of time-space compression should alert one
to potential dangers associated with geopolitics and nationalist conflict. He
believes mental maps and, as a result, political thinking have not changed
sufficiently in response to the processes of time-space compression and
flexible capitalism. He argues that people's imaginations have not altered
sufficiently to cope with the bewildering pace of time-space compression,
evoking in turn a sense of uncertainty and unease. The decline of the nation
state, in terms of its control over fiscal and monetary policy, has not been
linked with a necessary internationalisation of politics, as Harvey also notes.
In such a vacuum, he argues, these processes can be seen to be encouraging
the growth of localism and nationalism. This is due to the need for security
that an attachment to place can offer in a time of great insecurity, resulting
from the changes linked to postmodern and globalising processes. Thus
Harvey here offers an interesting theory as to why the decline in the role of
the nation state, due to supranational factors and agencies, can occur at the
same time as nationalism and political fragmentation is reasserting itself in
different parts of the globe.17 Hence postmodernity, in this context, offers a
perplexing dynamic between cohesion and disintegration, yet another of the
paradoxes associated with the postmodern world.
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42 GEOPOLITICS
Theories Regarding Postmodern Conflict and Their Relevance for the
Former Yugoslavia
There are a number of theories as to why conflicts can and will erupt in
postmodern society. However, the main strands in debates on this issue
seem to be summarised in two contesting positions: one is that such
conflicts are linked to economic or structural factors and the other perceives
all conflicts as clashes between different cultural groups. Both these
positions have considerable relevance in an attempt to understand the
confusing myriad causes of the conflicts that accompanied the
disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. The remainder of this paper will
consider the usefulness of these viewpoints in the context of the wars in the
former Yugoslavia. Before doing so, it must be noted that other possible
reasons for engaging in conflict in postmodern times has recently come to
the fore. One of these involves engaging in hostilities for humanitarian
purposes. While the intervention of US troops in Somalia in 1992 could be
portrayed in such a light, it is perhaps the recent NATO action against
Yugoslavia, in response to the ethnic cleansing of Albanians within Kosovo
by Serb forces, that is the most notable example of this. Opponents of such
actions often claim that the real reason for humanitarian based conflict may
lie instead in a desire by the perpetrators of such action to extend spheres of
influence into new regions. The NATO action in Kosovo could be seen in
such a light and was condemned by the Russian Federation which perceived
it as an unwarranted transgression into the territory of a country it believed
to be within the Russian sphere of influence. Another interpretation would
be to claim that postmodern conflicts emerge as a means of justifying the
enormous amounts of government military expenditure, in order to also
mollify the powerful arm manufacturing lobbies within countries such as
the USA.
Economic Aspects of National Based Conflict
Of all the factors to be considered in studies of the causes of different
conflicts, it is usually economics that proves to hold most sway. Many wars
have been fought for reasons such as creating spheres of economic interest,
territorial acquisition, and controlling regions that are rich in resources. In
many cases, such conflicts may be couched in terms of factors such as
ideology, religion, and humanitarianism to ensure the support of the relevant
citizenry for the war effort. Such a scenario has been seen in the case of
some of the Yugoslav conflicts. Part of the rationale behind Serb attacks on
the regions of Eastern Slavonia and Kosovo lay in the economic value of
these areas: Eastern Slavonia for its rich agricultural land and oil; northern
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Kosovo for its valuable lead, zinc and silver mines. These conflicts were
then presented as being solely related to the protection of ethnic Serbs in
eastern Croatia18 or the retention of the 'cradle of Serb civilisation' for her
people.
A closer study of the economic aspects of globalisation is required in
order to develop an economic theory of postmodern conflict. It is clear that
competitive globalisation, by its pursuance of jobless growth, is creating
insecurities worldwide, as well as increasing economic inequalities that are
marginalising individuals, communities and indeed whole regions such as
Eastern Europe and the Third World. This helps create conditions in which
resentment, alienation and violent conflict grows. Growing material
inequities and increasing impoverishment resulting from processes of
competitive globalisation can spark off protests against governments. Geller
and Singer note a significant linkage between domestic disturbances and
engagements in foreign conflict.19 Underpinning these views were the anti-
Milosevic demonstrations in Belgrade in the lead up to both the earlier
conflicts in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia, as well as the present phase of the
conflict in Kosovo.
In such a vein, Houtart employs an economic framework, based on
observations regarding inequities caused by globalising processes, to
theorise about the basis from which future postmodern conflicts will
develop.20 He holds that the underlying cause of most future conflicts will
be rooted in such inequities. Peripheralisation caused by the globalisation of
economic systems, he holds, will revive amongst those marginalised by this
process forms of conflict which appear to be traditional in nature, but which
are actually linked to the low priority the postmodern economic system
places on issues of social justice. Indeed, with increased globalisation, most
of the economies in the former Yugoslavia - with the notable exception of
Slovenia - found themselves becoming more peripheral to the global
economy. This factor has undoubtedly had some influence on the outbreak
of hostilities in that region in the 1990s, while the economic dislocations
caused by the wars there have furthered the region's peripheralisation.
Hence, it appears that the humanitarian crises and economic devastation
associated with war could be prevented if international agencies such as the
UN and IMF acted in peripheral regions to ameliorate economic conditions
that may encourage the outbreak of hostilities. This would demand that the
World Bank and IMF, even when it may be against their own interests, help
to create structures where poor people worldwide are not 'treated as the
collateral damage of advanced capitalism' and hence do not have to resort
to violence.21
Recent debate regarding the 'pacifying' of the Balkan region has formed
around such an idea; that of a 'Marshall Plan' for all the Balkan countries.
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However one may have cause to doubt whether such a course of action will
be pursued, especially in the wake of the recent Balkan Stability Pact
summit. Held in Sarajevo on 30 July 1999, it has been considered to have
been showy, ill-prepared and premature, especially considering the
exclusion of Serbia, whose stability is key to long term hopes for peace in
the region.22 Most commentators claim that it was of little value other than
as a symbolic gesture, and amounted to nothing more than providing the
assembled world leaders with an expensive and showy photo opportunity.
This led a recent editorial in The Independent on Sunday newspaper to argue
that 'politicians presiding over the ruined Balkans need to be able to break
free of the pathological desire to shine on television screens at home'.23
This, of course, furthers the argument, touched on earlier in this paper, that
style and sound-bites are of more concern to postmodern politicians than are
the less media-friendly qualities of effective policy making and long-term
planning. Further causes for concern were the refusal of governments to
make long term commitments to the rebuilding of the region, as well as the
re-emergence of 'tied aid' as part of the relief pledged by certain
governments. In the light of this, one must question whether there is
sufficient motivation amongst Western governments to make a significant
financial commitment to the region, especially as the political capital
accruing to the 'successful' NATO military operation in Kosovo has
dwindled in the months subsequent to the cessation of hostilities there. As
has been the case with other troubled parts of the world, once the glare of
the media is drawn away from Kosovo and the rest of the Balkans and once
its worth as a means of bolstering public opinion has faded, it is likely that
the region will be forgotten by media conscious Western governments.
Perhaps the key impact that the economic forces of globalisation had in
causing the disintegration of Yugoslavia, and hence the resulting conflicts,
rested with the economic austerity programmes imposed on the country by
the IMF in the early 1980s. Such programmes have already been mentioned.
This action by the IMF was due to the Yugoslav state's inability to service
its debt in the wake of the global economic crises of the 1970s. As in many
parts of the Third World, this IMF intervention was to result in dire
economic problems for the people of Yugoslavia, providing a cautionary
tale against the imposition of the structures of Western capitalism on
economies that had worked according to other principles or ideologies.24
The result of enduring these restructuring programmes was to mean very
low, or even at times negative, GDP growth rates in Yugoslavia from 1980
onwards, as well as severe commodity shortages. Even in times of peace,
there were regular episodes of hyperinflation that reached a height of over
1,200 per cent in 1989. There were also drastic increases in the state's
unemployment rate, which reached a height of over 17 per cent in 1987.
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Considerable spatial variations in the unemployment rate existed within
Yugoslavia, with higher rates being recorded in some republics and
provinces. During the 1980s the rate averaged at over 20 per cent in Serbia,
nearly 30 per cent in Bosnia, Macedonia and Montenegro and nearly 60 per
cent in Kosovo. The two north-western republics fared much better, to the
extent that Croatia's rate stayed below 10 per cent for most of the 1980s
while there was full employment in Slovenia. Within the different republics
there were also spatial variations in the rate; for instance the Serb dominated
areas of the Krajina were to suffer much higher levels of unemployment and
economic depression than did the rest of Croatia. Youth unemployment was
also a factor: by 1985 the number of people under the age of 25 unemployed
had reached a height of 38.7 per cent.25 These factors describe the economic
malaise that was to create conditions of alienation and social dislocation in
parts of Yugoslavia, as well as growing resentment against forms of ethnic
bias in job allocation, which would combine to create an atmosphere in
which the likelihood of violent conflict would fester.
Part of the restructuring package was concerned with trying to increase
Yugoslavia's foreign currency earnings, so imports were to be reduced and
export-oriented production was to be increased relative to domestic
production. This had the impact of further favouring the more economically
developed republics of Slovenia and Croatia, which had very well
developed trade relationships with the Western European economies. This
ensured that the Slovene and Croat economies would not suffer the same
adverse effects that the other, less well developed regions in the south did,
as already seen in the case of unemployment. The further intensification of
the sharp economic gradient between these and the southern republics was
to lead them to believe that they could prosper to a greater degree as
independent entities.26 As well as being spared the burden of having to
transfer funds to the less developed republics, they felt they would have a
better chance, as relatively prosperous independent states, of gaining
admission to the European Union than the economically disadvantaged
Yugoslav Federation would as an entire entity. Hence, secessionist forces
grew in these republics, but most especially in Slovenia, in response to these
economic impulses. It is hardly surprising that the resultant rush of Slovenia
towards independence was to prove one of the sparks that led to the
disintegration of the Yugoslav Federation.
Another major reason for Slovenia and Croatia's desire to secede from
the Yugoslav Federation centred on their preference for a decentralised
economic system based more on private ownership. This was opposed to the
Milosevic regime's wish to maintain high levels of state ownership and an
economy that was more centralised on Belgrade. In this debate the Federal
government and the IMF, who believed a more centralised economy to be a
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prerequisite to ensure the success of their structural adjustment policies,
supported Milosevic. These concerns fed into a subsequent political debate
about the future governance of Yugoslavia in which the northern republics
were seen to favour looser links between the different republics, whereas the
Federal authorities, the Serbs and the IMF preferred a more centralised
political system. This debate, and the failure to resolve it, was to be the
factor that eventually resulted in the dissolution of Yugoslavia.
While a link between globalising economic forces and factors leading to
the development of the Yugoslav conflicts has been shown, it is important
to remember that monetary concerns were not the only factor driving events
in the Balkans. In the case of the secessionist republics, in many cases it was
not in their best financial interests to pursue such a course. Detachment
from the Yugoslav Federation, for instance, meant a breakdown in complex
inter-republic trade links that had played a key role in building up the
republic economies. Often global economic forces were resisted in the
course of the conflicts. Croatia and Slovenia pursued an independent course
in 1991 in opposition to the desires of most Western governments and
agencies, while Serbia's pursuance of the 'Greater Serbia' project and its
military activities in Kosovo came in defiance of economic sanctions.27
Cultural Aspects of National Based Conflict
The former Yugoslavia was the meeting place of three different religious
traditions: Islam (Bosnians, Albanians and those in the Sandzak region),
Orthodoxy (Serbs, Macedonians and Montenegrins), and Catholicism
(Croats, Slovenes and Hungarians). Such a spatial phenomenon takes added
weight when one considers the views of Huntington.28 In the wake of the
conclusion to the ideological conflicts associated with the Cold War, he has
argued that conflicts will mainly occur along the fault-lines between the
world's different 'civilisations'.29 Of interest here is his claim that the most
significant fault-line in this regard is that separating Protestant or Catholic
Western Europe from the Orthodox territories in Eastern Europe. He notes
that this line practically separates Slovenia and Croatia from the rest of the
former Yugoslavia, although the Western entity does also take in Vojvodina
and part of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This historical fault line has bisected
Europe for almost 1,500 years, ever since the Roman Empire was
partitioned between two emperors, one based in Rome and the other in
Constantinople. It is further reinforced by the fact that the Catholic
republics were under Hapsburg influence for a number of centuries,
whereas the other republics were either controlled or influenced by the
Ottoman Empire. Adding further complexity is the fact that these two
civilisations share frontiers with an Islamic civilisation: frontiers that also
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pass throughout the territory of the former Yugoslavia. This assumes special
relevance considering Huntington's claim that 'Islam has bloody borders'.30
Adapting Huntington's arguments, one can proceed to argue that this fault-
line, separating the different cultural and religious traditions of Yugoslavia, is
one of an interlinking set of factors that demands attention in a study of the
conflicts there. It also offers some insights on aspects of further postmodern
conflicts. First of all, given that religion had a key role to play in
differentiating between the different civilisations or ethnic groups within
Yugoslavia, it appears that religion will remain as a factor to consider in
studying causal scenarios for potential political conflict. This may be
somewhat surprising in the light of the highly secular nature of postmodernity,
but Huntington sees that as a mainly Western phenomenon and talks of an
'unsecularisation of the world' as being a key process affecting the other
major global civilisations.31 The post-Yugoslav conflict can also be placed in
the historical context of the wars that arose, either directly or indirectly, from
the schism between the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox traditions in
1054. Related to this, Lieven claims that there is an increasing sense of the
Orthodox world becoming culturally and economically peripheral to the core
regions of the global economy and civilisation.32 He claims that the recent
NATO actions against Serbia, placed in such a context, have bred, and will
breed, a sense of alienation towards the more prosperous West in Orthodox
countries. Hence the 1999 bombardment of Yugoslavia can be seen as another
factor deepening an already wide gap between the Orthodox periphery and the
more prosperous Catholic and Protestant parts of Europe.33
Huntington's views are also relevant when discussing the extent to which
European geopolitics impacted on the Yugoslav conflicts. Of particular
relevance in this context are the views of Houtart in relation to the role played
by Catholic geopolitics. He reflects that the Vatican and other European
Catholic powers desired that there would be a belt of Catholic countries
stretching from the Baltic down to the Adriatic, which could hence act as a
bulwark against the twin threats of Communism and Orthodoxy.34 It is in such
a context that one can understand why the Vatican, Germany35 and Austria so
rapidly recognised the independence of Croatia and Slovenia. This also
highlights the fact that the different combatants in the Yugoslav conflict were
supported mainly by those on the same side of Huntington's fault line. As well
as the Catholic support for Croatia and Slovenia, the Serbs attained most
sympathy from Orthodox countries such as Russia and Greece. The Bosnian
Muslims were supported by the Islamic world, even to the extent of receiving
armament supplies from Iran in the latter stages of the Bosnian conflict.36
While there is nothing new or especially postmodern about such a process,
this shows how traditional aspects of conflicts and alliances can be
reinterpreted so as to fit within a postmodern framework.
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One criticism of Huntington's theory, as regards its applicability to a
postmodern context, stresses the postmodern respect for otherness, as well
as the inherent concern of globalisation to strengthen forms of international
interconnectivity. However one has already seen how limited the
postmodern notion of respect for ethnic difference can prove to be,
especially in the context of growing racism in Europe and the events in
Yugoslavia. As regards the claims of globalisation to create greater
interconnectedness, Mlinar and Trcek note that often this only really applies
to the deepening of cultural links with the global core regions, such as the
USA. They also observe a noticeable reduction in the significance of links
between neighbouring European cultures at the same time.37 In some cases,
as with the different nationalities in the former Yugoslavia, if links between
neighbouring cultures are such that lines of communications between them
are already poor, then the process, pinpointed by Mlinar and Trcek, will
create a heightened sense of separateness, misunderstanding and fear
between the neighbouring territories, in which the seeds of future conflicts
can find fertile soil. Hence the limitations of postmodernity and
globalisation in this regard are such as to support Huntington's views.
A more pertinent critique of Huntington, with reference to Yugoslavia,
is that in many cases conflicts do not erupt along the dividing lines between
the different civilisations. Instead these involve scenarios where pockets of
certain ethnic groups find themselves located on 'the wrong side' of this
fault line, as with the case of the Krajina Serbs in Croatia. This, however,
may be seen as overly pedantic in that one is still considering areas in the
near vicinity of Huntington's fault-line. In addition, the conflict between the
Serb dominated JNA and the Croats in Eastern Slavonia and the wars
between Bosnian and Kosovar Muslims and the Christian Serb and Croat
forces would fit his scenario.38 Huntington's views are further reinforced by
the fact that Macedonia was the only seceding republic to escape military
attack from the Serbs, probably because both republics are Orthodox.39
Finally, it is interesting to note that there is a close link between
Huntington and an economically oriented theory of conflict. In his research
on war prone dyads, Bremer notes that interstate conflict is more likely
when one state is prosperous and its neighbouring state impoverished than
when both states are relatively prosperous.40 If this notion is extended to
embrace Huntington's line between the different civilisations of Europe,
then one will note a relatively prosperous terrain west of the line
encompassing key core economies, whereas all areas to the east of the line
are peripheral to the global economy. Applying Bremer's theory directly,
one would expect this line to be prone to regular outbreaks of conflict, very
much in keeping with Huntington's theory.
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Conclusion
This paper opened with a discussion of the main elements of our
postmodern and globalised world. These consisted not only of the recent
developments in society, economics and cultural patterns, but also of the
philosophical thinking that underpins these changes. As shown, there is
little originality in postmodernity, as it mainly involves a number of
borrowings from the past that are then reinterpreted in the light of this
insertion into a late twentieth century context. The re-emergence of
conflicts linked to ethnically based nationalism can be partially understood
in such a context. However such activities are very much at variance with
the stress in postmodernist thought on the importance of developing an
awareness of, an appreciation for, and a growing tolerance towards elements
of other cultures. The fact that there are many contradictions inherent in
postmodernity could partially explain such a dynamic, as could the claim
that much of postmodernism only applies to Western societies. Yet this does
not weaken the basis for viewing the events in the former Yugoslavia in
postmodern terms.
Two key aspects of these contemporary processes, the media and the
declining role of the nation state, were analysed with regard to their
importance as regards the growth of nationalist conflict. In some cases,
these processes were seen to be applicable to the Yugoslav conflicts. The
media were seen to be a key element in a postmodern understanding and
awareness of conflicts, albeit one that is susceptible to manipulation by
governments and other agencies so as to promote their own interests, even
if they are not directly involved in a conflict situation. In discussing the role
of the nation state, it was noted however that centripetal, globalising forces
are concurrently prompting an antithetical growth of centrifugal forces of
regionalism, nationalism and separatism, mainly because of the inequalities,
fears and uncertainties that the different processes of globalisation evoke.
The main postmodern theories outlining the most likely causal factors
for future conflicts were then outlined and related to the Yugoslav conflicts,
so as to see the extent to which these conflicts would fit the pattern of an
atypical postmodern conflict. As regards the economic impacts of
competitive globalisation, their capacity for evoking widening gaps in
monetary well-being between different individuals, regions and states was
seen as forming a basis for the growth of insecurities, resentments and
eventual hostilities. Applied to the Yugoslav situation, these forces were
most evident in the impacts of the economic restructuring programmes of
the IMF in the 1980s. The economic malaise and regional inequalities that
these policies sparked were seen to be prime causes of the resultant growth
of nationalism and secessionism that eventually brought about the
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disintegration of Yugoslavia. However, as the conflicts developed, many of
the warring sides were seen to be impervious to globalising economic
forces, often promoting their own nationalist programmes when it was not
seen to be in their best economic interests.
Huntington's 'fault-line' thesis offers a cultural rationale for an
understanding of future conflicts, seeing them as involving wars between
different civilisations, which would mainly occur at the cultural 'fault-lines'
where these civilisations come in contact. This thesis is seen to have
especial applicability in the case of the former Yugoslavia. Here the key
fault-line was perceived as being the historic line dividing Western
European civilisation from the Orthodox territories of Eastern Europe: a
line that divided the republics of Slovenia and Croatia from the other parts
of the former Yugoslavia. The former Yugoslavia, moreover, also contained
the 'fault-lines' between these entities and Islamic civilisation, adding
further to the relevance of Huntington's thesis, as did a number of economic
linkages with his theory that were noted. However, this theory is
problematic in that often the conflicts in the Balkans involved pockets of
ethnic groups located on the 'wrong' side of the fault-lines, such as the
Krajina Serbs in Croatia. It is difficult, likewise, to perceive future conflicts
in solely cultural terms, as a number of other factors or theories, related to
factors such as economics and politics, have to be taken account of. Another
difficulty with Huntington's thesis as a theory of postmodern conflict is that
it mainly involves a harking back to more traditional causes of conflict, such
as religion and ethnicity. However it could be argued that this is another
good example of the 'magpie' nature of postmodernity inherent in its
tendency to borrow certain elements from the past and re-image them for
our time.
There is a considerable congruence between the way conflicts in the
former Yugoslavia occurred and the various postmodern theories of conflict,
as shown already. As tempting as it might be to portray the Yugoslav wars
aa a form of an atypical postmodern conflict, it has to be admitted that too
many variances have been observed in this paper to view them as totally
fitting such a scenario. While the economic and cultural theories outlined in
this paper do offer some illumination to a study of the Yugoslav conflicts, it
must be argued that there is a need to consider other theories also, such as
those related to politics and the roles of certain individuals and elites. What
can be claimed is that the utilisation of a postmodern and globalising
framework offers an apt and novel means of understanding the causes of
Yugoslav conflicts, especially considering their complex nature.
Postmodern theories, and discussions related to these, should be further
refined so as to offer more insight into the events behind the Yugoslav wars,
as well as other recent conflicts. These findings could then be used so as to
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offer a framework to stratagems seeking to prevent seeking to prevent future
conflicts, thus ensuring that future debates on the issue of postmodern
conflict becomes solely a matter of theory and not of empirical observation.
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